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ABSTRACT
We examine the implications of a regional, fixed exchange rate regime  for global
exchange rate volatility. The concept of the optimum currency area turns out to play an
important role. The formation of a regional regime tends to decrease global volatility
when countries are symmetric. The effects  tend to be ambiguous in the case of
asymmetries. The reduction in global volatility is larger when the rest of the world has
more rigid labor markets than the peggers. When the exchange rate management is done
mostly by countries with relatively more flexible labor markets. And in the presence of a
negative correlation in productivity shocks across countries.
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The post Bretton Woods international monetary arrangements have been asym-
metric. Typically, some countries maintain a system of -more or less- ﬁxed parities
among themselves while, at the same time, allowing the external value of their
currencies to move freely against currencies that do not belong to their monetary
arrangement. We call such a regime a mixed system. The EMS and the EMU
are the most important examples in recent history of such regional, mixed regimes
(other examples include unilateral pegs, currency boards and so on).
Although a great deal of attention has been devoted to the study of ﬁxed
and ﬂexible exchange rate regimes as well as of monetary union1 in isolation, to
the best of our knowledge, no attempt has been made to study mixed systems.
The objective of this paper is to ﬁll this gap. We are mostly interested in the
global implications of a regional ﬁxed exchange rate regime and, in particular,
whether such a regime leads to a global reduction of exchange rate volatility or
simply transfers volatility from one part of the global system to another. Also, we
examine the factors that determine the type and magnitude of volatility transfer
that takes place. Note that our analysis is also applicable to currency unions, not
only ﬁxed regimes. While in principle, a currency union may seem diﬀerent from
a bilateral peg, in practice they have very similar properties.
The answers to the questions raised above are of practical importance. For
instance, they can help evaluate the contribution of the EMS (or EMU) to global
exchange rate volatility (for instance, its eﬀects on the DM/USD or the DM/GBP
rate). They can also form the basis for assessing the implications of EMU for the
EUR and USD exchange rates. If the formation of EMU brings about greater
global stability in exchange rates by itself then there may be less of a need for
explicit international policy coordination (e.g. the adoption of target zones by
major currency blocks) in order to achieve such an objective. Finally, one can
use our ﬁndings to think about what would happen to the rest of the world (say,
China’s exchange rate) if the EU, the USA and Japan decided to limit ﬂuctuations
in their exchange rates.
The existing literature has not yet provided a concrete framework for thinking
1See De Grauwe (2000).
5about these issues. And a priori, there does not seem to exist any strong presump-
tion concerning the sign of the global eﬀects. Volatility eliminated in one place
(say, in the DM/FF rate or in economic activity in Germany) may completely
disappear from the system. Alternatively, it may simply resurface elsewhere (say,
in the DM/GBP rate and in British macroeconomic activity). Moreover, general
arguments of the type that ”..if the ﬁxed exchange rate system lowers macroe-
conomic volatility in the pegging countries then it will also reduce exchange rate
volatility..” may not be informative because the direction of volatility changes is
not uniform across the main economic variables.
We believe that these questions can be best addressed within the context of
a multi-country, general equilibrium model of the type commonly used nowadays
in the exchange rate literature (for examples of a two country version, see Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan, 2000, Collard and Dellas, 2002). We use a three country
model whose main features include perfect competition, nominal wage rigidities2,
active monetary policy (forward looking Taylor rules) and a variety of shocks (sup-
ply, ﬁscal and monetary). We use a generic calibration of the model that relies
heavily on parameters commonly used in the literature and serves as a useful bench-
mark. Its purpose is to illuminate the role played by various factors that have been
emphasized in the optimum currency area literature (the degree of labor market
ﬂexibility and the existence of various types of international asymmetries).
We ﬁnd that a regional ﬁxed exchange rate regime tends to decrease global
exchange rate volatility if there is suﬃcient symmetry in the world economy. The
results tend to be more ambiguous in the presence of asymmetries, a factor that has
been emphasized by the optimum currency area –OCA– theory. In particular, the
reduction in volatility is greater when the ”ins” have more ﬂexible labor markets
than the ”outs”. When the pegging is done by a country with a relatively more
ﬂexible labor market and with more volatile productivity. And in the presence
of negative correlation in productivity across countries. Based on the obtained
relationship between country characteristics and volatility, we speculate that global
exchange rate volatility would be more likely to decline under a bilateral EUR/USD
targeting or if it were the US –rather than the EMU members– that unilaterally
2Other sources of nominal rigidities are possible. Our choice of wage rather than price rigidities
is motivated by recent empirical work by Christiano et al (2001) that ﬁnds that the former
dominate.
6targeted the EUR/USD rate.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the three
country model. Section 2 describes the calibration and section 3 presents the main
ﬁndings.
2 The model
There three countries, A, B and C which are modelled in a similar fashion3 so we
describe only one country, B (a technical appendix to this paper, available at our
website, oﬀers a detailed description of the other two countries).
The economy consists of a large number of identical households and ﬁrms, a
ﬁscal authority and a monetary authority.
2.1 The household










where 0 < ¯ < 1 is a constant discount factor, CB
t denotes consumption in period
t and hB
t number of hours worked by the representative household in country B.
U(CB
t ;hB
t ) is a utility function, increasing and concave in its ﬁrst argument, and
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where µ is a weight for the marginal utility of leisure.
In each and every period the B household faces two budget constraints. The




































































3Nevertheless, they may still diﬀer in terms of size, economic structure, shocks and so on.
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t is the B-A exchange rate, e
B;C
t is the B-C exchange rate, e P
j
t is the
price paid for an asset that will deliver 1 unit of country j’s currency (j = A, B,
C) next period if state ` realizes (that is, we assume complete asset markets). A
typical B household owns bB
j;t, j = A, B, C, such assets entering period t. MB
t is the
stock of money held by the UK household in period t, T B
t is lump-sum taxes, W B
t
is the nominal wage, zB
t is the rental rate for capital, KB
t is the physical capital
stock at the beginning of period t, ΠB
t are the proﬁts of the UK ﬁrms and NB
t is
a per-capita amount of money issued by the central bank of B and given to the
households in the form of a helicopter drop.
According to the budget constraint, the B household enters period t holding an
amount of money equal to Mt; it receives income from its ﬁnancial investments,
bB
j;t; from its labor services, and from renting capital to the ﬁrms. It also receives
its share of the proﬁts distributed by the ﬁrms and its share of the money injection
by the central bank of country B. It uses these funds to buy new ﬁnancial assets,
to build its cash reserves, to pay taxes and to purchase goods for consumption and
investment purposes.



















t + (1 ¡ ±)K
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t (5)
where 0 · ± · 1 denotes the rate of depreciation. The concave function Φ(:)
captures the presence of adjustment costs to investment. It is assumed to be twice
diﬀerentiable and homogenous of degree 0. Furthermore, we assume the absence




Finally, we will assume that –at least a fraction of– the nominal wages is ﬁxed
one period in advance at a level that is equal to the expected labor market clearing
8wage. In particular, the ﬁxed nominal wages are set using labor contracts of the
form W
j
t = (1 ¡ #)f W
j
t + #Et¡1f W
j
t where f W
j
t is the nominal wage that would clear
the labor market in a Walrasian framework, and 0 6 # 6 1 is the share of labor
contracts in the economy. Admittedly, this assumption is ad hoc, in spite its
popularity. Nevertheless, setting the nominal wage based on some maximization
criterion does not change the properties of the model.
The households that have signed labor contracts must then supply whatever
quantity of labor is demanded by the ﬁrms.
2.2 The ﬁrms
There are two types of ﬁrms, those that produce an intermediate good, Y , and
those that produce a ﬁnal good, Q.












where Kt denotes the physical capital stock at the beginning of period t. Γt
represents Harrod neutral, deterministic, technical progress evolving according to
Γt = °Γt¡1. ° ¸ 1 denotes the deterministic rate of growth. aB
t is a stationary,
exogenous, stochastic technology shock.4
The representative intermediate good ﬁrm chooses the quantity of capital and















Y t is the price of the B intermediate good.
The country speciﬁc intermediate goods are then combined to produce the ﬁnal











j;t denotes the amount of B intermediate good that is used as an input to
produce country j’s ﬁnal good in period t.
Note that physical capital, once installed, cannot be shifted internationally.
This seems plausible. Note also that ﬁnancial capital is perfectly mobile.
4The stochastic properties of the technology shock will be speciﬁed later.
92.3 Production of the ﬁnal domestic good
The production of the ﬁnal good in B, QB
















































where $4, is the weight of A goods in the B ﬁnal good basket, $5, is the weight
of C goods in this basket and $6 denotes the weight of B goods in the domestic
(B) basket. Recall that Y
j
B;t is the amount of the intermediate good of country
j (j = A, B, C) used in the production of the B ﬁnal good. 1
½¡1 is the elasticity
of substitution between the domestic and foreign intermediate goods. This way
of modelling import and export activities is called the Armington aggregation and
implies that the imported goods have to be transformed into a domestic good,
QB
t , before they can be consumed or used for investment. It follows that the three
countries will have diﬀerent price levels for their ﬁnal goods, P i
t, as these goods
are not perfect substitutes.










where GB is B’s government expenditure.
2.4 The government
In each period the government acquires an amount Gt of the ﬁnal good. The cycli-
cal component of government expenditures (gt = Gt=Γt) is exogenously determined
by a stationary AR(1) process such that:
log(gt) = ½g log(gt¡1) + (1 ¡ ½g)log(g) + "gt (12)
with j½gj < 1 and "gt Ã N(0;¾g).










102.5 The monetary authorities
The behavior of the monetary authorities depends on the international monetary
arrangement in place. Under a ﬂexible exchange rate regime, we assume that
monetary authorities pursue active monetary policy. In particular, central banks




















t is the gross nominal interest rate, ½B denotes the degree of interest rate
smoothing, Et(b Y B
t+1) is expected output (relative to target), Et(b ΠB
t+1) is expected
CPI inﬂation (relative to target) and ³B
r;t is an exogenous policy shock (for instance,
a change in the inﬂation target or variation in the nominal interest rate that is
not due to a response of the cental bank in B to deviations of inﬂation or output
growth from their target levels). KB
y and KB
Π are ﬁxed weights.








where ¹t is the gross rate of growth. This is selected endogenously in order to
deliver the nominal interest rate dictated by the Taylor rule above. Note that per
capita (¹B
t ¡ 1)MB
t is equal to NB
t (see the household’s budget constraint).
In addition to the ﬂexible exchange rate system we consider a unilateral peg
by country A. Under this regime, A selects the growth rate of its supply of money,
¹t, in order to maintain a ﬁxed A-C exchange rate (while the central bank in C
pursues its own interest rate rule). This policy is implemented by solving for the
exchange rate as a function of the state variables of the system (a set that includes
¹t) and then selecting a value for ¹t that satisﬁes the exchange rate target, e:
Our framework can be easily adapted to deal with bilaterally pegged systems. We
abstract from them because they seem to be of limited practical relevance.
5We have also experimented with Taylor rules that include an exchange rate target. As it is
commonly reported in the literature, such speciﬁcations do not ﬁnd much of an independent role
for exchange rate policy.
112.6 The equilibrium
We now turn to the description of the equilibrium of the economy. Recall that
capital is perfectly mobile across countries while labor is not.


































































































(i) given a sequence of prices fPtg1
t=0 and a sequence of shocks, fQ1
tg1
t=0 is a
solution to the representative household’s problem;
(ii) given a sequence of prices fPtg1
t=0 and a sequence of shocks, fQ2
tg1
t=0 is a
solution to the representative ﬁrms’ problem;
(iii) given a sequence of quantities fQtg1
t=0 and a sequence of shocks, fPtg1
t=0























































as well as the ﬁnancial, money and capital markets.
12(iv) Nominal wages are set using labor contracts of the form W
j





t where f W
j
t is the nominal wage that would clear the labor market in
a Walrasian framework, and 0 6 # 6 1 is the share of labor contracts in the
economy.
3 Model parameterization: Calibration
The model is solved under a generic set of parameters. which imposes perfect sym-
metry across countries in all but a single dimension. The asymmetric dimension
regards either the labor markets where we allow diﬀerent degrees of wage rigidities
across countries, or the conduct of monetary policy where we allow diﬀerent coun-
tries to follow diﬀerent Taylor rules, or, ﬁnally, the properties of the exogenous
shocks. The symmetric parameter values used6 are similar to those typically used
in the open economy literature (see Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1995) shown in
table 1.
Insert Table 1
The technology shock is assumed to follow a stationary AR(1) process of the
form
log(at) = ½a log(at¡1) + (1 ¡ ½a)log(a) + "a;t (22)
with j½aj < 1 and "a;t Ã N(0;¾2
a). We set a = 1.
3.1 Solution
After adjusting the variables for both technological progress and nominal growth
(that is, making the model stationary) we calculate the deterministic steady state
and log–linearize around it. The resulting dynamic system is solved using standard
methods.
6We assume a common average rate of money supply growth for simplicity. For the ﬂexible
exchange rate regime we can easily allow for long term diﬀerences in money supply and inﬂation.
This does not matter for the results, as we work with deviations from the steady state.
134 The results
The solution to the model is used to compute the various moments. We focus
exclusively on the issue of volatility, but other properties of the solutions can be
easily computed. Tables 2–4 report the results. We report results under diﬀerent
conﬁgurations of
² the degree of nominal wage rigidity (tables 2–3)
² the properties of the supply shock and the monetary policy rule (table 4)




Several interesting patterns emerge. First, if all the countries are symmetric,
then the regional peg leads to lower global exchange rate volatility, and this occurs
independent of the overall level of nominal wage rigidity (see ﬁrst three blocks
in table 2). Second, the positive eﬀects on volatility are more pronounced when
the ”outs” have less ﬂexible labor markets than the ”ins” (compare the forth
and ﬁfth blocks in table 2 under either a bilateral or a unilateral peg). Third,
labor market asymmetries for the ”ins” matter signiﬁcantly, specially when the
rest of the world (ROW) has rigid labor markets (compare the results in the ﬁrst
block –high ROW wage rigidity– to those in the second block –low ROW wage
rigidity– in table 3). Forth, the positive eﬀects on global exchange rate volatility
are greater under a unilateral peg when the relatively more ﬂexible wage country
does the exchange rate targeting (in the ﬁrst block in table 3, the country doing
the exchange rate targeting, A, has ﬂexible labor markets; in the third one, it has
a relatively inﬂexible labor market). And ﬁfth, the sign of the correlation between
productivity shocks in the ”ins” matters for the eﬀects of the mixed regime on
exchange rate volatility. As expected, volatility decreases when this correlation is
positive and increases when it is negative (second block in table 4).
14Based on the obtained relationship between country characteristics and volatil-
ity, we can draw some conclusions concerning what would happen to the global
volatility of the exchange rates if the EUR=USD rate were targeted by either the
US or EMU members or both. First, assuming that the US has ﬂexible and the
EMU zone rigid labor markets, the eﬀects of targeting the EUR=USD on the re-
maining ﬂexible rates depends on whether the rest of the world had ﬂexible or rigid
labor markets. Volatility would be more likely to decrease –and by more– in the
latter case (again compare the ﬁrst to the second block in table 3). And second,
we speculate that global exchange rate volatility would be more likely to decline
under a bilateral peg or if it were the US –rather than the Euro zone countries–
that targeted the EUR=USD rate. We base this on the fact that volatility de-
creases by more when the exchange rate targeting is done by the country with: a)
the more ﬂexible labor market (compare the ﬁrst to the third blocks in table 3);
b) the more volatile supply shocks (table 4). Both of these factors favor exchange
targeting by the US (which has a higher volatility of the estimated Solow residuals
and more ﬂexible labor markets than the Euro zone).
Before concluding, we must oﬀer a caveat. Our results depend critically on
the assumption that the only source of volatility in the economy is fundamen-
tal shocks. There is a widespread belief, though, that much of the volatility in
exchange rates, at least in the short run, is due to noise. Unfortunately, there
does not yet exist a satisfactory way for modelling such factors in current general
equilibrium macroeconomic models.
5 Conclusions
A great deal of attention has been devoted to the study of ﬁxed and ﬂexible
exchange rate regimes but no attempt has been made to study mixed systems. In
this paper we have investigated the implications of a regional ﬁxed exchange rate
system for global exchange rate volatility.
The main ﬁnding is that asymmetry (a concept emphasized in the optimum
currency area literature, see Tavlas, 1993), plays an important role in determining
how much of the volatility that is eliminated somewhere in the global system
resurfaces somewhere else. Global exchange rate volatility tends to decrease under
symmetry. This eﬀect is more pronounced when the rest of the world has more
15rigid labor markets than the countries that peg their exchange rate. There are
greater gains under asymmetry, when the exchange rate stabilization is done by
more ﬂexible wage countries. And ﬁnally, positive comovements in productivity
across countries tend to increase global exchange rate volatility under a regional
ﬁxed regime.
Based on the obtained relationship between country characteristics and volatil-
ity we speculate that global exchange rate volatility nowadays would decline were
the US and the EMU group to bilaterally target the EUR/USD peg (and the eﬀect
would be larger if the rest of the world had relatively rigid labor markets). Under
the same circumstances, a unilateral arrangement would also have good exchange
rate volatility properties as long as it were the US rather than the Euro zone
countries that did the exchange rate targeting.
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17Table 1: Calibration
Discount factor ¯ 0.99
Rate of real growth ° 1.0069
Depreciation rate ± 0.020
Labor share 1 ¡ ® 0.64
Substitution between domestic and foreign goods ½ 0.25
Adjustment cost ' -0.174
Weight of home goods in home GDP $ii 0.80
Trade interdependence between i and j $ij 0.10
Persistence of technology shock ½a 0.93
Volatility (sd) of technology shock ¾a 0.007
Persistence of government spending shock ½g 0.90
Volatility (sd) of government spending shock ¾g 0.02
Money supply gross rate of growth ¹ 1.0228
Persistence of money shock ½m 0.0
Persistence in policy rule ½ 0.8
Inﬂation reaction coeﬃcient KΠ 1.5
Output reaction coeﬃcient Ky 0.1
Volatility (sd) of money shock ¾m 0.0014
18Table 2: The eﬀects of labor market ﬂexibility on exchange rate volatility under
symmetrya
yA yC yB pA pC pB eAC eAB eCB
#A = 1, #C = 1, #B = 1
FL 1.80 1.80 1.80 1.82 1.82 1.82 2.02 2.02 2.02
FU 1.81 1.76 1.80 1.55 1.72 1.83 0.00 2.02 2.02
FB 1.76 1.76 1.80 1.60 1.60 1.82 0.00 1.75 1.75
#A = 0:5, #C = 0:5, #B = 0:5
FL 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.75 2.75 2.75 4.19 4.19 4.19
FU 1.79 1.90 2.09 2.14 2.38 2.82 0.00 4.19 4.19
FB 1.84 1.84 2.06 2.01 2.01 2.75 0.00 3.63 3.63
#A = 0:1, #C = 0:1, #B = 0:1
FL 2.47 2.47 2.47 3.69 3.69 3.69 5.94 5.94 5.94
FU 1.97 2.17 2.54 2.82 3.07 3.80 0.00 5.94 5.94
FB 1.99 1.99 2.47 2.47 2.47 3.69 0.00 5.15 5.15
#A = 1, #C = 1, #B = 0:5
FL 1.80 1.80 2.05 1.82 1.82 2.73 2.02 3.20 3.20
FU 1.81 1.76 2.08 1.56 1.72 2.79 0.00 3.32 3.32
FB 1.76 1.76 2.05 1.61 1.61 2.73 0.00 3.03 3.03
#A = 0:5, #C = 0:5, #B = 1
FL 2.05 2.05 1.80 2.74 2.74 1.83 4.19 3.20 3.20
FU 1.79 1.90 1.81 2.13 2.36 1.85 0.00 2.98 2.98
FB 1.83 1.83 1.80 2.00 2.00 1.83 0.00 2.42 2.42
aThe reported numbers are standard deviations. yi is GDP in country i,
i = A;B;C. pi is inﬂation in i. eij is the nominal exchange rate between i
and j. FL has all three countries in a ﬂexible exchange rate system while FU
has A pegging unilaterally its currency to C’s currency and FB refers to a
symmetric bilateral peg between C and A. #i is the degree of nominal wage
rigidity in country i (#i = 1 denotes perfect wage rigidity).
19Table 3: The eﬀects of labor market ﬂexibility on exchange rate volatility under
asymmetrya
yA yC yB pA pC pB eAC eAB eCB
#A = 0:1, #C = 0:8, #B = 1
FL 2.45 1.86 1.80 3.66 2.15 1.83 4.55 4.22 2.47
FU 2.15 1.81 1.80 2.31 2.02 1.81 0.00 2.39 2.39
FB 2.04 1.76 1.80 2.25 1.87 1.83 0.00 2.49 2.49
#A = 0:1, #C = 0:8, #B = :4
FL 2.46 1.86 2.15 3.67 2.16 2.97 4.55 5.30 3.80
FU 2.17 1.82 2.15 2.33 2.04 2.98 0.00 3.92 3.92
FB 2.05 1.76 2.15 2.26 1.88 2.97 0.00 3.94 3.94
#A = 0:8, #C = 0:1, #B = 1
FL 1.86 2.45 1.80 2.15 3.66 1.83 4.55 2.47 4.22
FU 1.82 2.10 1.82 2.11 2.93 1.90 0.00 3.80 3.80
FB 1.76 2.04 1.80 1.87 2.25 1.83 0.00 2.49 2.49
aThe reported numbers are standard deviations. yi is GDP in country i,
i = A;B;C. pi is inﬂation in i. eij is the nominal exchange rate between i
and j. FL has all three countries in a ﬂexible exchange rate system while FU
has A pegging unilaterally its currency to C’s currency and FB refers to a
symmetric bilateral peg between C and A. #i is the degree of nominal wage
rigidity in country i (#i = 1 denotes perfect wage rigidity).
20Table 4: The role of asymmetries in the supply shocks and policy in exchange rate
volatilitya
yA yC yB pA pC pB eAC eAB eCB
¾("A
» ) = 0:004, ¾("C
» ) = 0:007, ¾("B
» ) = 0:007
FL 1.15 1.79 1.79 1.17 1.81 1.81 1.84 1.84 2.02
FU 1.19 1.74 1.79 1.08 1.70 1.82 0.00 2.02 2.02
FB 1.14 1.74 1.79 1.04 1.57 1.81 0.00 1.70 1.70
¾("A
» ) = 0:007, ¾("C
» ) = 0:004, ¾("B
» ) = 0:007
FL 1.79 1.15 1.79 1.81 1.17 1.81 1.84 2.02 1.84
FU 1.78 1.14 1.80 1.49 1.10 1.82 0.00 1.84 1.84
FB 1.74 1.14 1.79 1.57 1.04 1.81 0.00 1.70 1.70
¾("»A;»B) = 0:009
FL 2.03 2.03 1.83 2.03 2.03 1.86 0.85 2.02 2.02
FU 2.04 2.07 1.83 2.13 2.05 1.86 0.00 2.02 2.02
FB 2.05 2.05 1.83 2.09 2.09 1.86 0.00 1.97 1.97
¾("»A;»B) = ¡0:014
FL 0.99 0.99 1.71 1.13 1.13 1.71 3.52 2.02 2.02
FU 0.99 0.35 1.73 0.00 0.00 1.76 0.00 2.02 2.02
FB 0.54 0.54 1.71 0.00 0.00 1.71 0.00 0.98 0.98
¾("B
z ) = 0:0045
FL 1.93 1.81 1.81 2.23 1.85 1.85 3.63 3.63 2.02
FU 1.81 1.76 1.80 1.55 1.72 1.83 0.00 2.02 2.02
FB 1.82 1.82 1.81 1.68 1.68 1.85 0.00 2.31 2.31
aThe reported numbers are standard deviations. yi is GDP in country i,
i = A;B;C. pi is inﬂation in i. eij is the nominal exchange rate between i
and j. FL has all three countries in a ﬂexible exchange rate system while FU
has A pegging unilaterally its currency to C’s currency and FB refers to a
symmetric bilateral peg between C and A. #i is the degree of nominal wage
rigidity in country i (#i = 1 denotes perfect wage rigidity).
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